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ARGUMENT 
I. 
BASED UPON THE DEFINITION OF "DISABILITY" IN 
SECTION 34A-2-102(6), THE TERM, "COMPENSATION" 
IN SECTION 34A-3-110 DOES INCLUDE MEDICAL 
EXPENSES 
Claimant argues that because Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code requires a comparison 
between non-employment disability or death and employment disability or death, there could be 
no such comparison when there is no "disability", only medical care, at issue and, therefore, 
"compensation" under Section 34A-3-110 does not include payment of medical expenses. While 
WCF agrees that had the legislature specifically included the phrase "medical care and treatment" 
along with "disability or death", this appeal would have been avoided, the definition of 
"disability" under Section 34A-2-102(6) of the Utah Code, includes the term "compensation", 
which, as fully argued in WCF's opening brief, also includes medical expenses. 
The Workers Compensation Act defines1 "disability" as "an administrative determination 
that may result in an entitlement to compensation as a consequence of becoming medically 
impaired as to function. Disability can be total or partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or 
nonindustrial." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-102(6) (2005) (emphasis added). As WCF already 
explained in its opening brief, the definition of "compensation", just three subsections before, 
includes "payments and benefits provided for in . . . [the] Occupational Disease Act." Id., 
Subsection(3). Thus, at least for purposes of Section 34A-3-110, "disability" does include 
conditions that result only in the need for medical care and treatment for which payment of 
As explained in WCF's opening brief, definitions under the Workers Compensation Act are also applicable to the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-102(2) (2005). 
1 
medjcal expenses would be required. Indeed, the term "disability" is used elsewhere is the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. That provision states that "[t]he disabled employee is entitled to 
medical . . . expenses equivalent to those provided in Chapter 2." Id., § 34A-3-107 (emphasis 
added). Apparently, under the Utah Occupational Disease Act, "disability" equates with "injury" 
or "medical condition". Otherwise, there would be inconsistency between two sections of the 
same chapter. A statute should be interpreted "in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter 
and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, U 17, 66 P.3d 592, 597; 
II. 
THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE REASON TO DEPART FROM 
THE GENERAL DEFINITION OF "COMPENSATION" 
UNDER SECTION 34A-3-110 
Claimant next argues that, despite the fact that "compensation" under Section 34A-2-102 
does appear to include medical expenses, at other places in the Utah Labor Code2, 
"compensation" probably does not include medical expenses. Claimant cites to eight provisions 
that he contends distinguish medical benefits from compensation benefits. In general, WCF 
agrees that within the specific context of the eight provisions cited, a narrower definition of 
"compensation" that does not include medical expenses is appropriate; however, Claimant has 
failed to adequately demonstrate why the context of "compensation" in Section 34A-3-110 
requires a more narrow definition of that term here.3 Indeed, until Edmonds v. Epixtech, Order 
on Motion for Review, Case No. 02-0969 (Appeals Board, August 29, 2006), the Labor 
Commission itself applied the more general definition of "compensation" to apportionment under 
2
 The Utah Labor Code encompasses all of Title 34 A, which includes both the Woikeis Compensation Act and the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act 
J
 WCF lecogmzes that in Point I of his bnef, Claimant is aiguing that the context of Section 34A-3-110, does 
lequne a moie nanow definition of "compensation" heie, howevei, as aigued m Point I of this bnef, that contention 
is not "adequate " 
2 
Section 34A-3-110. Milligan v. Utah State Tax Commission, Order on Motion for Review, Case 
No. 00-0232 (Labor Commissioner, April 3, 2002). 
Moreover, as WCF contends in its opening brief, there are also provisions of the Utah 
Labor Code that do require the more general definition of "compensation" under Section 34A-2-
102(2).4 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court, in Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 743 P.2d 1183, 
1185-86 (Utah 1987), held that under Section 35-1-62,5 "compensation does include medical 
expenses. 
III. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KENNECOTT CASE ARE 
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE INSTANT CASE 
Petitioner finally argues that the Appeals Board properly relied upon Kennecott Copper 
Corp .v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1975) for its determination that medical 
expenses are not "compensation" subject to apportionment under Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah 
Code. WCF explained in its opening brief why Kennecott6 is distinguishable here. That case 
involved interpretation of the statutes of limitations. If the more general definition of the term 
"compensation" had been used in that context, it would have rendered the separate statute of 
4
 See Brief of Petitioners, at 5, 7. The specific provisions are: Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-3-107 (2005); 35-1-62 
(1984). Although WCF has not made an exhaustive search of the Labor Code, Section 34A-3-111 provides that 
"[t]he compensation provided under this chapter is not in addition to compensation that may be payable under 
Chapter 2, and in all cases when injury results by reason of an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment and compensation is payable for the injury under Chapter 2, compensation under this chapter may not 
be payable". Id., § 34A-3-111. Surely, the legislature did not intend that an injured worker could not recover 
indemnity benefits for the same injury (medical condition) under both the Workers Compensation Act and the 
Occupational Disease Act, yet could recover medical expenses under both acts? 
5
 Now codified as W., § 34A-2-106. 
6
 And, because it, likewise, involves a statute of limitations issue, Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 
755 (Utah 1982). 
3 
limitations for medical expenses, as opposed to indemnity benefits, meaningless. Moreover, as 
already discussed, supra, the Taylor case illustrates the narrowness of the Kennecott holding.7 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should vacate the Decision of the Labor 
Commission and remand the case for further proceedings before the Appeals Board and ALJ. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this /£— day of April, 2007. 
AJ/^^~^ 
Floyd V^Jnolm, Attorney for Petitioners 
7Claimant argues that the interpretation of "compensation" under Kennecott has been allowed to stand; however, the 
apparently contrary inteipretation of "compensation" under Taylor has also been allowed to stand. "Compensation" 
means different things in different contexts. 
4 
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